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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 
The question for decision is whether an order to pay 
restitution to fraud victims in a federal criminal proceeding 
at a time prior to the October 1998 amendments of the 
Bankruptcy Code is dischargeable in bankruptcy under 11 
U.S.C. S 523. The District Court determined that Abdur 
Amin Rashid's restitution obligation was statutorily exempt 
from discharge as a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture payable to 
and for the benefit" of the United States underS 523(a)(7). 
We conclude that Appellant's restitution obligation was 
dischargeable in bankruptcy because it was payable to the 
benefit of his defrauded victims and not "to and for the 
benefit" of any governmental unit. We will reverse the 
judgment of the District Court insofar as it holds otherwise 
and will affirm its judgment in all other respects. 
 
I. 
 
A federal jury convicted Appellant Abdur Amin Rashid of 
fifty-four counts, including mail fraud, wire fraud and 
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money laundering, which stemmed from Rashid's operation 
of a fraudulent commercial loan operation. The District 
Court sentenced Rashid to 168 months incarceration, 
assessed $2,700 in fees and fined him $15,000. The 
Probation Office determined that Rashid's fraud cost his 
victims $1,696,470 and the sentencing court ordered 
Rashid to pay criminal restitution in that amount. This 
Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. United States v. 
Rashid, 66 F.3d 314 (3d Cir. 1995) (unpublished), cert. 
denied, 516 U.S. 1121 (1996). By order entered May 18, 
1994, Rashid's interest in real estate at 444 East Mt. 
Pleasant Avenue, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania was forfeited 
to the United States pursuant to 18 U.S.C. S 982(b)(1). We 
affirmed the forfeiture. 
 
Confronted with considerable debt after his federal 
conviction for fraud, Rashid filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
protection. Among his creditors were the victims of his 
fraud to whom he owed in excess of $1.6 million pursuant 
to a criminal restitution order. On July 6, 1994, Rashid 
filed his voluntary bankruptcy petition and on August 4, 
1994, the Bankruptcy Court clerk mailed a notice of 
bankruptcy to his creditors including the United States. 
The United States claims to have never received this notice. 
On August 19, 1994, the United States Attorney for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania filed a judgment lien on 
his Philadelphia property. Rashid then filed an adversary 
proceeding against the United States in Bankruptcy Court 
alleging that (1) his criminal restitution obligation was 
dischargeable in bankruptcy, (2) the forfeiture order was a 
fraudulent transfer within the meaning of 11 U.S.C.S 548 
and (3) the United States should pay damages for the 
imposition of a judgment lien in violation of 11 U.S.C. 
S 362(h). After an Assistant United States Attorney received 
service of the complaint, she requested that the 
Prothonotary for the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas 
remove the judgment lien, but the Prothonotary failed to 
remove the lien promptly. The lien remained in effect for 
eleven months until the United States learned that the 
Prothonotary had not removed the lien and again requested 
the Prothonotary remove the lien. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court determined that the issue of 
whether Rashid's restitution obligation was dischargeable 
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in bankruptcy was not fairly presented in his adversary 
complaint and dismissed the claim on summary judgment. 
On appeal the District Court disagreed but affirmed, 
concluding that the restitution obligation was statutorily 
exempt from discharge because the obligation was a"fine, 
penalty, or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a 
governmental unit, and [was] not compensation for actual 
pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty." 11 U.S.C. 
S 523(a)(7). 
 
The District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court's order 
on June 3, 1998. Rashid filed a motion for rehearing on 
June 17, 1998, which the District Court dismissed as 
untimely and without merit on July 10, 1998. Rashidfiled 
his notice of appeal to this Court on August 13, 1998. 
 
It bears repetition that this case arose prior to October 
1998 and we concern ourselves only with circumstances 
taking place prior to the amendment of the Bankruptcy 
Code, an amendment that puts a new gloss on cases 
involving the dischargeability of restitution obligations 
arising thereafter. Effective October 7, 1998, S 523 was 
amended to provide: 
 
       A discharge under [relevant sections of the Code] does 
       not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-- 
 
       (13) for any payment of an order of restitution is sued 
       under title 18, United States Code. 
 
11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(13) (1998).1 
 
II. 
 
Prior to reaching the merits of this appeal, we must 
determine if Rashid timely filed his notice of appeal. The 
time limits for filing a notice of appeal are"mandatory and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although not decided by any court of appeals, it is unlikely that this 
statute applies retroactively. See In re Gelb , 187 B.R. 87, 90 n.6 
(Bankr. 
E.D.N.Y. 1995) (holding that S 523(a)(13) does not apply retroactively), 
aff 'd, 1998 WL 221366, *2 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (unpublished); In re 
Kochekian, 175 B.R. 883, 885 n.1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 1995) (same). 
Because neither party to these proceedings suggestsS 523(a)(13) should 
apply to this appeal, we need not reach this issue here. 
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jurisdictional." Krebs Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. v. Valley 
Motors, Inc., 141 F.3d 490, 495 (3d Cir. 1998). Rule 4(a) of 
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that in a 
civil case in which the United States is a party a notice of 
appeal must be filed within sixty days of the entry of 
judgment in the district court. See also Rule 6(b)(1) 
(applying Rule 4(a) to bankruptcy appeals). The District 
Court entered an order affirming the Bankruptcy Court's 
order on June 3, 1998. Rashid filed his notice of appeal to 
this Court on August 13, 1998, ten days after it was due. 
 
If a timely motion for rehearing under Bankruptcy Rule 
8015 is filed, the time to appeal runs from entry of the 
order disposing of the motion for rehearing. See  Rule 
6(b)(2)(A)(i), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Rashid's 
motion for rehearing was required to be filed within ten 
days after entry of the judgment of the District Court; the 
tenth day was Monday, June 15, 1998. The District Court 
Clerk's Office did not receive his motion until June 17, 
1998. 
 
Rashid, however, is a federal inmate entitled to the 
benefits of the teachings set forth in Houston v. Lack, 487 
U.S. 266 (1988), in which the Court recognized that 
prisoners proceeding pro se confront a situation unique 
from other litigants because they are unable tofile 
personally in the courthouse and must depend on prison 
officials for delivery. The Court crafted a rule that deems a 
pro se prisoner's notice of appeal filed at the moment it is 
delivered to prison authorities for mailing to the district 
court. See id. at 270. 
 
We have previously extended this rule in two ways 
relevant to this appeal. First, we have held that Houston 
applies to notices of appeal filed in bankruptcy appeals. See 
In re Flanagan, 999 F.3d 753, 758 (3d Cir. 1993). We 
reasoned that "[a] pro se prisoner seeking to appeal a 
bankruptcy court order faces precisely the same problems 
as a prisoner who wishes to file a pro se appeal from an 
order dismissing a habeas petition." Id. Second, we have 
extended Houston to motions to alter or amend judgment 
pursuant to Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
See Smith v. Evans, 853 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1988). By 
analogy we believe that the teachings of these cases should 
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apply to Rashid's Motion for Rehearing pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Rule 8015, "the bankruptcy counterpart" to 
Rule 59(e), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Matter of 
Grabill Corp., 983 F.2d 773, 775 (7th Cir. 1993). 
 
Rashid seeks the benefit of the prisoner mailbox rule, 
and he has filed a declaration pursuant to Rule 4(c)(1) that 
permits a prisoner to demonstrate timely filing by 
submitting a declaration "in compliance with 28 U.S.C. 
S 1746 or by a notarized statement, either of which must 
set forth the date of deposit and state that first-class 
postage has been prepaid." Rule 4(c)(1), Federal Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. Rashid filed a declaration properly 
sworn under penalty of perjury stating that he handed his 
motion with first-class postage prepaid to prison officials on 
Friday, June 12, 1998. See 28 U.S.C. S 1746. The United 
States has offered no evidence to rebut Rashid's assertion. 
Accordingly, we find that Rashid timely filed his notice of 
appeal. 
 
Jurisdiction was proper in the District Court pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. S 158(a). Jurisdiction is proper in this court 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 158(d). Because the District Court 
sat as an appellate court, reviewing an order of the 
Bankruptcy Court, our review of the District Court's 
determinations is plenary. See In re Continental Airlines, 
125 F.3d 120, 128 (3d Cir. 1997). "In reviewing the 
bankruptcy court's determinations, we exercise the same 
standard of review as the district court." Fellheimer, Eichen 
& Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Technologies, Inc., 57 F.3d 
1215, 1223 (3d Cir. 1995). Therefore, we review the 
Bankruptcy Court's legal determinations de novo , its 
factual findings for clear error and its exercise of discretion 
for an abuse thereof. In re Engel, 124 F.3d 567, 571 (3d 
Cir. 1997). 
 
III. 
 
Rashid's initial contention is that his restitution 
obligation is dischargeable in bankruptcy. Before we reach 
this issue, we must address whether Rashid's adversary 
complaint in the Bankruptcy Court fairly presented this 
claim. The court concluded that "no portion of[Rashid's] 
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complaint . . . could fairly be classified as seeking a 
determination of the dischargeability of a debt" pursuant to 
Bankruptcy Rule 4007. In re Rashid, Bankr. No. 94- 
14226F, at 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995). The Bankruptcy Court 
appeared to weigh heavily Rashid's failure to distinguish 
the dischargeability of his restitution obligation as an 
independent claim. On appeal, however, the District Court 
construed the pro se complaint more liberally and 
determined that Rashid did properly seek dischargeability 
of his restitution obligation. We agree with the District 
Court that Rashid's complaint should be liberally read as 
raising the dischargeability claim. See Haines v. Kerner, 
404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). 
 
The gravamen of Rashid's adversary complaint attacks 
the propriety of the lien the United States placed on his 
home in light of the automatic stay. See 11 U.S.C. S 362. 
The amount of the lien placed on Rashid's home was the 
sum of his criminal fine, restitution and special 
assessments. In paragraph 9 of the complaint, Rashid 
alleged that the Government filed a "false and fraudulent 
lien" against him "to block the Plaintiff 's efforts to 
discharge[,] through Bankruptcy, Court Ordered restitution 
to and for the benefit of the alleged victims as 
compensation for their actual pecuniary loss." See Compl. 
P 9. Rashid further alleged that the Government "knew or 
should have known, that, the restitution amount mentioned 
[ ] is dischargeable under the Bankruptcy Code . . . . Such 
restitution amount is not exempted [from discharge] by 
Title 11, U.S.C., Section 523(a)(7)." Id. 
 
The Bankruptcy Court viewed Rashid's statements 
concerning his restitution obligation not as an independent 
claim but as support for the alleged malfeasance of the 
Government--that the Government not only improperly 
recorded a lien during the pendency of an automatic stay 
but also inflated the amount of the lien by including the 
amount of the restitution order that they "knew or should 
have known" was dischargeable. We believe this was too 
strict a reading of Rashid's pro se allegations. Rashid's 
complaint provided the United States with notice of the 
facts underlying his claim, because he cited the applicable 
statute and provided a statement that his restitution 
 
                                7 
  
obligation should be discharged. That Rashid intertwined 
this dischargeability claim with another does not preclude 
recognition of the independent nature of the claim. Indeed, 
an adversary complaint is precisely the vehicle in which a 
debtor can seek to declare a particular debt dischargeable. 
Bankruptcy Rules 4007, 7001(6). We conclude that the 
District Court properly determined that Rashid's complaint 
adequately pleaded his claim for discharge. We turn now to 
the merits of Rashid's claim. 
 
IV. 
 
The sentencing judge accepted the probation officer's 
calculation of restitution pursuant to United States 
Sentencing Guidelines S 5E1.1, which incorporates the 
Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. 
S 3663. See United States v. Copple, 74 F.3d 479, 482 (3d 
Cir. 1996). We have previously held that criminal 
restitution is a debt and is dischargeable in bankruptcy 
unless statutorily exempted. In re Johnson-Allen , 871 F.2d 
421, 426 (3d Cir. 1989). Among those debts not 
dischargeable in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy are debts created 
by a "[1] fine, penalty, or forfeiture[2] payable to and for 
the benefit of a governmental unit [that] [3] [are] not 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax 
penalty." 11 U.S.C. S 523(a)(7) (emphasis added). To 
determine whether Rashid's restitution order is 
dischargeable under S 523(a)(7), we must determine 
whether his debt meets the three requirements of the 
section. We initially conclude that Rashid's restitution 
obligation is a "fine, penalty or forfeiture" that is "not 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss." 
 
In Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 51 (1986), the Court 
considered whether restitution ordered pursuant to a 
Connecticut statute was exempt from discharge under 
S 523(a)(7). Without much discussion, the Court assumed 
the restitution was a fine and fell within the scope of the 
first requirement of S 523(a)(7). Although restitution 
appears to be "compensation for actual pecuniary loss" 
from the perspective of the victim, restitution is actually 
something more. "Governments seek restitution to promote 
law enforcement by deterrence as well as by compensation 
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. . . ." In re Towers, 162 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. 
denied, 119 S. Ct. 2340 (1999). That the restitution order 
corresponds to the loss of the victim and is perceived by the 
victim to be compensation for his loss does not, without 
more, prove that the goals of restitution pursuant to the 
VWPA are strictly compensatory. Requiring that the 
defendant compensate the victims for their loss 
 
       forces the defendant to confront, in concrete terms, the 
       harm his actions have caused. Such a penalty will 
       affect the defendant differently than a traditionalfine, 
       paid to the State as an abstract and impersonal entity, 
       and often calculated without regard to the harm the 
       defendant has caused. Similarly, the direct relation 
       between the harm and the punishment gives 
       restitution a more precise deterrent effect than a 
       traditional fine. 
 
Kelly, 479 U.S. at 49 n.10 (citation omitted); see Towers, 
162 F.3d at 955; see also United States Dep't of Hous. & 
Urban Dev. v. Cost Control Mktg. & Sales Management of 
Va., Inc., 64 F.3d 920, 928 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he `not 
compensation for actual pecuniary loss' phrase in 
S 523(a)(7) refers to the government's pecuniary loss."). 
Accordingly, we find that Rashid's restitution order was a 
fine and was not for the compensation of his victims' actual 
pecuniary losses. 
 
However, the second requirement, that the amount be 
"payable to and for the benefit of the governmental unit," is 
not satisfied. In Kelly, the debtor was required to pay 
restitution to the Connecticut welfare authority from which 
she fraudulently received payments. See Kelly , 479 U.S. at 
38-39. A governmental unit kept the restitution and 
deposited the monies into the state treasury. In Kelly, there 
was no doubt that the restitution was "payable to and for 
the benefit of a governmental unit." The issue becomes 
more complex when, as here, the restitution is payable to 
private victims. 
 
Arguably, restitution paid to a private victim is still paid 
for the benefit of the Government--i.e., the Government 
receives the benefit of criminal deterrence. To determine 
whether restitution owed to private victims is still for the 
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benefit of the Government, an analysis of whether 
restitution is fundamentally penal or compensatory is 
helpful but not dispositive. Courts have often considered 
restitution fundamentally penal.2See United States v. 
Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1998); United States v. 
Sheinbaum, 136 F.3d 443, 448 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 
119 S. Ct. 1808 (1999); United States v. Savoie , 985 F.2d 
612, 619 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Vetter, 895 F.2d 
456, 459 (8th Cir. 1990); see also United States v. Bruchey, 
810 F.2d 456, 460-461 (4th Cir. 1987) (concluding that 
VWPA is fundamentally penal in nature but that 
nevertheless a civil settlement can absolve the defendant of 
a need to pay restitution). But see United States v. 
Hampshire, 95 F.3d 999, 1005 (10th Cir. 1996) 
("[R]estitution orders issued pursuant to the VWPA are 
predominantly compensatory."). 
 
In Kelly, the Court also suggested that restitution orders 
pursuant to the VWPA were penal sanctions. Id.  at 53 n.14. 
In support of this proposition, the Court commented: 
 
       [t]he criminal justice system is not operated primarily 
       for the benefits of the victims, but for the benefit of 
       society as a whole. Thus, it is concerned not only with 
       punishing the offender, but also with rehabilitating 
       him. Although restitution does resemble a judgment 
       "for the benefit of " the victim, the context in which it 
       is imposed undermines that conclusion. The victim has 
       no control over the amount of restitution awarded or 
       over the decision to award restitution. Moreover, the 
       decision to impose restitution generally does not turn 
       on the victim's injury, but on the penal goals of the 
       State and the situation of the defendant. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Restitution, however, has both compensatory and punitive aspects. 
See United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 91 (3d Cir. 1998). We have 
previously characterized the VWPA as both compensatory and punitive. 
Compare Government of Virgin Islands v. Davis, 43 F.3d 41, 47 (3d Cir. 
1994) (holding that restitution under the VWPA was more akin to 
compensation for actual loss than a criminal penalty that may not bear 
interest) with United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(holding that restitution ordered pursuant to the VWPA was not a 
separate civil proceeding that required a jury trial but a criminal 
penalty 
that was "an integral part of the sentencing process"). 
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Kelly, 479 U.S. at 52 (1986). Although the Court grounded 
its opinion on federalism concerns, some courts have found 
the wording of this section of Kelly broad enough to reach 
restitution ordered pursuant to the VWPA. See United 
States v. Cadell, 830 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he 
language in the [Kelly] opinion extends generally to penal 
sanctions of restitution without regard to whether the court 
imposing the sanction is a state or federal court."). 
 
However, in Towers, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit observed that S 523(a)(7) "offers 
weak support for exempting restitution orders from 
discharge" without the aid of federalism concerns because 
S 523(a)(7) "does not mention restitution, and it operates 
only if the penalty is `for the benefit of a governmental unit' 
--a condition not easy to satisfy when the governmental 
body is collecting for private creditors."3 Towers, 162 F.3d 
at 954; see also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 419 
n.4 (1990) (stating the goal of the VWPA is "compensating 
victims"). The Court held that the context in which the 
word " `benefit' appears--`payable to and for the benefit of a 
governmental unit'--implies that the `benefit' in question is 
the benefit of the money that is `payable to' the 
governmental unit." Id. at 956. But see Vetter, 895 F.2d at 
459 (holding without comment that Kelly applies to 
restitution paid to a victim bank); Zajder v. Hill Dep't Store, 
154 B.R. 885 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1993) (holding restitution 
paid to a local department store is not dischargeable 
pursuant to Kelly). 
 
We find the reasoning in Towers persuasive. The word 
"payable" clearly casts an economic light over the phrase 
that suggests that the benefit must be conferred from the 
monetary value of the debt to be paid by the defendant and 
not the more abstract benefit of criminal deterrence. 
 
Similarly, we would pervert the clear, unambiguous 
language of S 523(a)(7) if we found that Rashid's restitution 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Towers concerns a civil rather than criminal order of restitution. 
Federal criminal restitution orders and civil restitution orders share one 
important distinction from Kelly--neither implicates the federal court's 
longstanding "reluctan[ce] to interpret federal bankruptcy statutes to 
remit state criminal judgments," Kelly, 479 U.S. at 44. 
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obligation was "payable to" a governmental unit. Although 
the record is unclear whether Rashid's restitution 
obligations were to be directly paid to his victims or were to 
pass through a governmental unit before reaching the 
victims, it is clear that the benefit--the money--is 
ultimately payable to the victims. See Towers , 162 F.3d at 
955. Accordingly, we find that Rashid's restitution 
obligation is not exempt from discharge pursuant to 
S 523(a)(7). 
 
V. 
 
Rashid's remaining arguments do not merit much 
discussion. He asserts that the forfeiture of the 
Philadelphia property to the United States was a fraudulent 
conveyance under 11 U.S.C. S 548 because the prosecution 
intentionally used perjured testimony to obtain both his 
conviction and the forfeiture of the Philadelphia property. 
Compl. P 6. Section 548 permits transfers to be set aside if 
infected by actual fraud. In such an instance, the debtor 
must have initiated the transfer "with actual intent to 
hinder, delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor 
was or became, on or after the date that such transfer was 
made or such obligation was incurred, indebted." 11 U.S.C. 
S 548(a)(1). 
 
Section 548 covers also constructively fraudulent 
transfers. Among the elements for a constructively 
fraudulent transfer is that the debtor "received less than a 
reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer." 
11 U.S.C. S 548 (a)(1)(2)(A). We agree that Rashid received 
nothing--i.e., well below a "reasonably equivalent value"-- 
when the Philadelphia property was forfeited to the United 
States. He received nothing from the sale because he lacked 
any interest in the property. When a forfeiture order is 
entered, the United States obtains title relating back to the 
moment of the criminal activity absent a claimant's credible 
showing that he was an "innocent owner" under the 
forfeiture statute. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista 
Avenue, 507 U.S. 111, 125-126 (1993); United States v. One 
1973 Rolls Royce, 43 F.3d 794, 818-820 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(defining the "innocent owner" defense). Rashid has not 
shown that he was an innocent owner of the Philadelphia 
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property and thus, upon entry of the judicial forfeiture 
order, the Government's title to the property vested and 
related back to the time the criminal activity at issue took 
place. Because Appellant cannot show that he had an 
interest in the Philadelphia property at the time of 
forfeiture, see BFP v. Resolution Trust Co., 511 U.S. 531, 
535 (1994), his contention must fail. To the extent he seeks 
to have us revisit the integrity of his conviction, we decline 
to do so. 
 
Similarly, Appellant's third contention suffers from the 
same fatal flaw as his second.4 During the pendency of 
Rashid's appeal of the forfeiture order, but after Rashid 
filed for bankruptcy, the United States recorded a lien on 
Rashid's Philadelphia property. During the proceedings in 
the Bankruptcy Court, the Government conceded that 
Rashid had some interest in his Philadelphia property 
during the pendency of his appeal of the forfeiture order.5 
The Government's post-petition filing of its judgment was 
then improper under 11 U.S.C. S 362(a). An injured debtor 
may only recover actual damages including attorneys' fees 
for a willful violation of a stay and, in appropriate 
circumstances, may recover punitive damages. 11 U.S.C. 
S 362(h). 
 
We agree with the Bankruptcy and District Courts that 
Rashid cannot allege any injury from the lien. He was 
incarcerated at the time the lien was in effect and not 
residing at the property. The Government did not attempt 
to foreclose on the lien nor did Rashid attempt to mortgage 
or sell the property. Moreover, once the forfeiture became 
final, ownership of the premises reverted to the Government 
from the day that Rashid's criminal activity began. See 92 
Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. at 125-26. This preceded the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Rashid argued also that the District Court erred in allowing the 
Government to file its brief out of time. The District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in accepting the brief out of time"in the interest of 
expediting decision or other good cause." Bankruptcy Rule 8019; Mar. 
26, 1998 Order, at P 8. 
 
5. Because we conclude Rashid's claim must fail even if he did have an 
interest in the property, we need not decide if Rashid actually had a 
legal 
interest in the Philadelphia property. 
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date the Government placed a lien on the property. 
Accordingly, Rashid's request for damages is without merit 
and was properly dismissed. 
 
*  *  * 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the District Court insofar 
as it held that Rashid's obligation to pay restitution was not 
dischargeable in bankruptcy, and we will remand to the 
District Court with a direction to enter an order of 
discharge. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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